The Role of Inheritance in Development

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Abstract – This article discusses the role of inheritance in development. The problem of succession is one of the most important and necessary issues in philosophy and it is of great importance in the analysis of development. In the article, the author tried to argue that the main reason for the emergence and development of peoples with different socio-economic conditions, different ideological views is the law of inheritance.

Keywords – Inheritance, philosophy, development, socio-economic conditions, society, ideological views

I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of succession is one of the most important and necessary issues in philosophy and it is of great importance in the analysis of development. Whether philosophers use the concept of inheritance in solving this or that problem: nature, society, or any phenomenon of thought, they use the concepts that describe the problem of inheritance, whether they know it or not. The law of inheritance is the main reason for the emergence and development of today's diverse world, that is, the plant and animal world with different quality states, peoples with different socio-economic conditions, different ideological views.

II. MAIN PART

Although the ancient Greek philosophers did not specifically study the concept of inheritance, they acknowledged the connection between the past, present, and future in explaining the origin of objects, events in the world. That is why F.Yu. Ismailov emphasizes the service of the ancient Greeks, especially Aristotle, in the origin of the concept of inheritance. “Since nature is the beginning of action and change, it is impossible to leave unclear what action is because the subject of research is nature. Ignorance of action leads to ignorance of nature ”. Apparently, here Aristotle did not consider inheritance as a separate problem. However, F.Yu. Ismailov emphasizes that Aristotle's contribution to the expression of the hereditary relationship between the past, present and future is great. The philosophers of the Eastern Renaissance went deeper into the essence of succession. Although the concept of succession has not risen to the level of a philosophical category, its content is evident in the minds of philosophers such as Ibn Sina, Beruni, Farobi, who played an important role in the history of world philosophy. In particular, the following opinion of Farobi vividly illustrates this: He must also change the past, which embodies bad habits. Otherwise, if the requirements of the past are followed and the mood is maintained, there will be no ease, change and growth in life. ”

1 Аристотель. Метафизика М.: 1937.-С.40
It follows from Farobi’s view that there is a positive and a negative relationship between the past and the present. This form of connection is what we call inheritance today. With this idea, Farobi comes very close to Aristotle on the problem of inheritance. It takes the connection between the past and the present, between the old and the new, as an essential condition of development. Aristotle also views the movement of nature as an objective process. Farobi, on the other hand, sees the movement, that is, the movement leading to development, in the sphere of society, not only as an objective process, but also as a dialectical unity of objectivity and subjectivity. Emphasizes the need to take into account specific conditions in the development of society and its reform, that is, the leader "changes the legacy of the past according to the needs of life."

With this idea, Farobi was much more advanced than Aristotle in understanding the development of society. He urges to abandon the negative aspects of this inheritance, while encouraging an inherited approach to inheritance.

Farobi places a great deal of value on the place of the individual in the development of society. It is clear from his opinion that the direction in which the given objective conditions are directed depends on the activity of the person. So, although objective conditions are necessary here, it is not enough, the further development of society will depend very much on the activity of the individual, on what kind of person he is, that is, on the subjective factor.

Although Farobi did not use the concept of inheritance, only his above-mentioned idea embodied the essence of any definition of inheritance.

The concept of inheritance was first analyzed by the German philosopher Hegel on a dialectical basis. Hegel viewed inheritance as an important element of the law of negation. Inheritance is represented by Hegel as a form of general connection. While expressing the law of negation, Hegel dialectically expresses the relationship between ‘removed’ and ‘retained’ properties, i.e., the destructive and constructive process. In Hegel, the concept of "removal" does not mean "disappearance" in its entirety, but in a more perfect form.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism did not consider inheritance as a separate object of study, but it should not be wrongly concluded that inheritance is not a philosophical category. The concept of inheritance should be considered as the most general and most important category of dialectics. Let us not look at any category of dialectics, where we encounter the element of inheritance: individuality, specificity and generality, cause and effect, necessity and chance, and so on. we observe that progress in processes is manifested on the basis of inheritance. At least let’s take necessity and coincidence. Coincidence is a necessity, and only such a necessity manifests itself through inheritance.

For example, cotton opens in four bowls, five bowls, etc., but no matter how many bowls it is, it is cotton. The opening of cotton in several bowls is a coincidence, and this coincidence is expressed in its opening as cotton, that is, in necessity. All categories of dialectics represent the connection between subject events, the connection that represents development even when there is a connection. The category of inheritance expresses this connection more clearly. Inheritance is the connection between different stages of development — without which the process of development as a whole would not take place. In this sense, we can call inheritance philosophical genetics. On the importance of inheritance, Kremyansky says: “Inheritance is of great importance not only for the biological form of being. Suffice it to say that without internal inheritance, there can be no progressive development in general.”

Inheritance not only represents the connection between the old and the new, but also determines the direction of development. Depending on the nature of the inheritance, progress can be progressive or regressive. Since the concepts of progressive and regressive are expressed at different levels of development, we can conclude that there is no inheritance in the process at the same level (i.e., evolving from the bottom up). Inheritance is precisely the connection between the lower and upper levels. In the philosophical literature published in the former Union, the definition expressed by E.A. Baller is more common. In particular, AA Abdurahmanov and F.Yu. Ismailov, who gave an in-depth analysis of the concept of inheritance in the Uzbek philosophical literature, also cited E. Baller's definition of inheritance. “Inheritance is the connection between the various stages of development of a being, as well as cognition, which represents the preservation of this or that element (whole) or individual aspects in the

4 Кремянский В.И. К обсуждению философских вопросов генетики.// Вопросы философии. 9/1970. С.133
transition of the whole as a system from one state to another. By connecting the present with the past and the future, inheritance ensures the stability of the whole."⁵

F.Yu.Ismailov draws attention to a "defect" in Baller's definition: "Inheritance represents the connection between an event, process and object. Without this connection there can be no interdependence and interdependence between them. This objective connection is represented by horizontal succession".⁶

In my opinion, the use of the concept of horizontal inheritance is inappropriate. I would also like to draw attention to E.A. Baller’s observation in the division of inheritance into species: “Since the main types of evolution are evolution and leaps (changes in quantity and quality), the following should be distinguished: a) inheritance at the same level; b) different levels of inheritance.

Inheritance at the same level is observed in quantitative changes, i.e., in certain, relatively stable changes. Different levels of change are related to quality changes ».⁷

It is impossible to agree with Baller's opinion. “There is no moment of succession in processes that take place at the same level. Because there is no progress from the bottom up, there is no progress."⁴ F.Yu.Ismailov expresses a very correct opinion. The introduction of the concept of horizontal inheritance, as well as the same level of inheritance, in our view represents a departure from dialectics. Baller himself expresses an opinion contrary to his definition of inheritance. While inheritance expresses a connection at different stages of development, it is contrary to dialectics to recognize the same level of inheritance, that is, inheritance without qualitative change, which, firstly, and secondly, the division of inheritance into such types takes it beyond the law of negation. It is well known that the law of negation expresses the spiral nature of development. The concept of inheritance at the same level, on the other hand, makes progress a straight line. As long as the object or object structure is preserved in quantitative changes, what Baller calls inheritance is nothing more than a simple iteration. Repetition can be said to be inherited if the event repeats itself at a certain point, i.e., at a high point where it has perfected itself. But any repetition is not an inheritance. In such a process of denial, the object, the event, seems to return to its past. In fact, the old repeats itself in the new, repeating itself in a higher form as it repeats itself. It is as if acknowledging a return to the old does not diminish the importance of progressive development and succession, but rather reveals its essence. “Without analyzing succession,” A.A. writes. Abdurahmanov, who denies and denies the dialectic of development, says that the interrelationship between the old and the new is incomprehensible, because every event is a unity of difference and identity. Every piece, every process is different and at the same time has something in common. The existence of this commonality, as a special manifestation of inheritance, requires a repetition in the development of this phenomenon.»⁸

It follows from this that inheritance is not a category pertaining to any law, but a necessary condition of development, that the laws of development are manifested in an event. Simple repetition is of great importance in the development of thinking. Because it expresses the generality of subject events and creates new concepts in thinking. But this repetition does not elevate subject events from the bottom up, but only develops thinking. Let’s say trees like apples, grapes, etc., have the property of bearing fruit, so we call them fruit trees. In this case, a general concept emerges from the specific concepts, but it remains the same as the apple apple, the grape vine. It is therefore necessary to look at succession from a dialectical point of view.

The absoluteness of ‘inheritance at the same level’ leads to a metaphysical understanding of progress, more precisely to the understanding that progress consists of simple multiplication and decrease. Inheritance is the connection between a denied and a denied event. This was expressed by Gegel as follows. "… The other, in essence, is not something that is completely denied, but ining is different from the first: that is, it represents in itself the accuracy of the first."⁹ dry denial does not represent progress.

It should also be noted that it is incorrect to assume that inheritance is specific only to progressive processes, which also occur in regressive events. In our view, Baller wanted to express the notion of inheritance that quantitative changes are also related to qualitative changes, and here he was distracted, ignoring the fact that inheritance takes place as a synthesis.

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⁶ Исмаилов Ф. Ю. Преемственность в историческом процессе. Т.: 1999. С.22.
⁸ Абдурахмонов А.А. Проблема преемственности в развитии духовной культуры .Т.:1990.
We do not want to deny the interdependence of the laws of dialectics, but we must admit that the laws of dialectics characterize different aspects of development. the law of unity and struggle of opposites reveals the source of progress. That is, if the answer to the question of why development occurs, the law of the transition of quantitative changes from qualitative and qualitative changes to quantitative changes represents the mechanism of development. This law answers the question of how progress happens. Denial, on the other hand, represents the direction of development, the connection between the old and the new, and inheritance is manifested as a form of this connection. Therefore, when interpreting the concepts pertaining to each law in relation to another law, it is first necessary to keep in mind which category of law this concept belongs to. The division of inheritance into different levels stems from this very error. It is as if inheritance at the same level stems from evolutionary development, and inheritance at different levels stems from revolutionary development. Inheritance denial is the essence of the law of negation. The process of denial takes place through inheritance. It is the category of inheritance that makes it possible to understand denial as a dialectical denial. For dialectics, denial as a moment of connection, of development, is characterized by denial through the preservation of the positive. The concept of inheritance is a synthesis of the concepts of negation as a moment of development, negation, which maintains a positive. That is why this denial is the basis of the law of negation. So are the categories of negation and inheritance used as synonyms, or are they different concepts? In our opinion, this aspect of the issue has not yet been approached in depth, and this problem requires separate research. If we say that these concepts are synonyms, these concepts are identical concepts, so there is no need to use the concept of inheritance in expressing the law of negation. If these concepts are not identical, then the concepts of dialectical negation and inheritance have their own characteristics. These concepts intersect at some point with the moment of connection, the moment of development, the properties of maintaining the positive. The concept of dialectical negation is a broader concept than the concept of inheritance, which, along with the above features, also includes the moment of discarding aspects that cannot adapt to innovation. Dialectical negation and inheritance differ at this point. The concept of inheritance represents the developmental trend of an element that has been preserved in the past, representing its repetition in a more perfect, more perfect form.

III. CONCLUSION

That is why the concept of inheritance expresses the essence of the law of negation. The concepts of dialectical negation and inheritance complement each other. Of course, the concept of denial cannot be expressed dialectically without inheritance, without succession. But in the use of these concepts, emphasis is placed on specific aspects of development. In the concept of inheritance, this emphasis reinforces the attitude towards the past, the old, and this attitude rises to the dialectical level.

REFERENCES

